Tax Incentive Provisions And The User Cost Of Capital:  The Case Of Greece by Anastassiou, Thomas A.
Journal of Applied Business Research – Second Quarter 2006                                                    Volume 22, Number 2 
 61 
Tax Incentive Provisions 
And The User Cost Of Capital: 
The Case Of Greece 
Thomas A. Anastassiou, (Email:  anastassiou@aueb.gr), Athens University of Economics and Business 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
According to the neoclassical framework the quantitative influence of tax policy measures on capital 
spending is exercised through the parameters that define the desired stock of capital and more 
specifically through the user cost determinant (c). A tax-adjusted user cost expression is formulated 
and time series of user cost are calculated using the usual tax parameters (like depreciation 
allowances, tax credits, investment grants, investment allowances and the like) that are incorporated 
in the value of c and which have been taken from the Greek tax incentive structure. The test of fiscal 
parameters on investment was made for the two kinds of capital assets, equipment and structures, 
since expenditure on these two comprise on average an almost 85 per cent of total manufacturing 
investment in Greece. What the research showed for the period under investigation was that c, the 
cost of capital variable, was not affected much by tax provisions, and in its turn could not affect 
decisively the desired level of capital stock and thus the amount of net investment.(JEL: E62)  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
major contribution of the neoclassical theory as developed by Jorgenson and his associates is offered 
in the field of analyzing the quantitative influence of tax policy measures on investment spending. 
The idea is based upon the sensitivity of investment to changes in the desired capital stock. It is 
assumed that businessmen take full and complete account of the incentives when deciding upon their desired capital 
stock. The effect of tax is exercised through the parameters that define the desired stock of capital and more 
specifically through the user cost determinant. 
 
The theoretical framework necessary to indicate the way the rental price of capital is formulated and how are 
fiscal parameters entered in its calculation is presented in Part 2; usual tax parameters that are incorporated in the 
value of  c  and that are presently considered, refer to tax credits, investment grants, investment allowances, initial 
allowances, and the like. Before deriving time series for user cost and commenting on their pattern (Part 4), an inquiry 
as to the operative nature of incentive provisions for Greece is made and relevant to user cost determinants are 
calculated (Part 3), given that all these would finally formulate the user cost variable. Conclusions are drawn in Part 5. 
 
A TAX-ADJUSTED RENTAL PRICE OF CAPITAL 
 
Let us suppose the firm is considering increasing its capital stock by one unit. This will require a current 
outlay of, say, q euros, while replacement expenditures in each future period will have to be increased by  qδ, with δ  
being  the rate of replacement. Given the price 
of output  p  and the marginal product of capital  (  Q/  K), gross revenues in each future period will be increased 
by p(  Q/  K). However, the net revenue in each future period will be increased by only i
Q
p q T
K

 
  
 
, 
where iT  is the increase in direct taxes that must be paid in period i . Defining iD  as the increase in depreciation 
A 
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charges for tax purposes in period i , we have i i
Q
T t p D
K
 
  
 
 where  t  is the tax rate on firm’s income. The 
investment would be worth  undertaking if the discounted value  of   the  increases in net revenue exceeds the price of 
capital, i.e. 
1
{(1 ) }(1 ) ii
i
Q
t p q tD r q
K





    

  
or 
1 1
{(1 ) }(1 ) . (1 )i ii
i i
Q
t p q r t D r q
K

 
 
 

     

                     (1) 
with r being the rate of discount. Tax depreciation charges will be increased as a result of the initial outlay of q euros, 
and will also be increased as a result of the replacement expenditures of qδ made in each future period. If id  is the 
amount of tax depreciation permitted per euro investment  i   periods after the investment is made, then the discounted 
value of depreciation charges stemming from the initial outlay  q  will be 
1
(1 ) ii
i
qd r



 . The discounted value of 
depreciation charges stemming from qδ of replacement in the next period will be 
1
1
(1 ) ii
i
q d r

 

 , one period 
after will 
2
1
(1 ) ii
i
q d r

 

  and so on. Defining by z the present value of depreciation charges stemming from a 
euro investment, i.e.
1 
1 2 3
2 3
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ....... (1 ) ii i
i
z d r d r d r d r

   

                         (2) 
then 
1 1
(1 ) (1 )i ii
i i
D r qz q z r
 
 
 
                         (3) 
Hence, the firm should add one unit to its capital stock if  
1
{(1 ) }(1 ) (1 )i
i
Q
t p q tq z r q tz
K
 




     

  
that is the  discounted  value of   the  increase  in  net revenue exceeds the net cost of a unit of capital. The latter 
expression can be written 
1
{(1 ) (1 )} (1 )
Q
t p q tz q tz
K r


    

 or  
 
( )(1 )
(1 )
Q q r tz
p c
K t
  
 
 
                     (4) 
where  c  is the tax-adjusted rental price of capital. The firm should continue to expand its capital stock until the 
marginal product of capital 
Q
K


is equal to the real price of capital c/p. The simplified derivation above was first 
presented by Coen (1968).  
 
Originally Jorgenson and his collaborators introduced a more complicated tax-adjusted user cost expression 
where some unobservable and unstable parameters were intervened and which expression had firms looking 
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backwards with concern on past price variations.  An alternative expression of the above form was presented later by 
Hall and Jorgenson (1967). The assumption underlying expression (4) is that the firm is looking forwards rather than 
backwards with static expectations.  Past price variations are ignored and fiscal parameters are expected to remain 
constant. 
 
According to (4)  if there are no direct taxes on the firm’s income, the fiscal term (1-tz)/(1-t) disappears, and 
the user cost of capital is simply expressed by  
 
( )c q r                                                                                                                                                                    (5) 
Taking  q

=dq/dt as the rate of change in the price (q) of investment goods, expressions (5) and (4) are transformed to  
( )c q r q

                                                                                                                                                            (6) 
and 
c = q (r + δ - q

) 
(1 )
(1 )
tz
t


                                                                                                                                               (7) 
 
A direct tax with no depreciation allowances (z = 0) increases user cost by the factor 1/(1-t); a depreciation 
allowance reduces user cost by the factor (1 – tz), tz  being the discounted value of tax savings which are expected to 
follow from one unit value of fixed investment.  In the case of immediate expensing (i.e. deduction of the cost of 
capital goods in the year of purchase), z will be unity and the existence of the direct tax would not alter user cost.
2
 The 
tax system in the latter case is said to be ‘neutral’ meaning that investment decisions are not influenced by taxation. 
 
To make exposition easier the incorporation of other fiscal parameters in the calculation of c, as for example 
tax credits, investment grants, investment allowances, initial allowances, etc., has not been considered. It is an easy 
matter to incorporate any of these tax instruments in the above user cost expression.  For the U.S. tax structure (Hall 
and Jorgenson, 1971, Coen, 1971) the existence of a tax credit (k) will provide the following user cost expression 
 
(1 )(1 )
( )
(1 )
k tz
c q r
t

 
 

                                                                                                                                       (8) 
or 
(1 )
( )
(1 )
k tz
c q r
t

 
 

                                                                                                                                            (9) 
depending on whether the tax credit is deducted (8) or not (9) from the depreciable base of acquisitions. The inclusion 
of an investment grant can be made in a similar way.  The effect of investment allowances or initial allowances needs 
to be incorporated in the calculation of the value of z since they represent relief which is given as a deduction from 
taxable income and not as a credit against tax. For an investment allowance of λ per cent per euro investment, the 
value of z will be  
1
(1 )
n
i
i
i
z d r 

                                                                                                                                                 (10) 
if, for example, the investment allowance is claimed in addition to depreciation allowances.
3
 Accelerated depreciation, 
if it is given as an increase in the permitted per year tax depreciation allowance percentage, will obviously be reflected 
in the id rate. 
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THE VALUE OF Z IN THE GREEK MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
 
Using the neoclassical framework, the value of z as we saw, will be given by:  
 
1
(1 )
n
i
i
i
z d r 

  .  
 
Given the value of z , if the revenues of a firm are taxed at rate  t,  then tz  will represent the discounted value 
of tax savings which are expected to follow from a unit value of fixed investment. Furthermore, variations in the value 
of  z,  when  t  is constant (or nearly constant, as it is found to be the case in Greece during the sample period), will 
make the implicit rental price of capital (c) vary, thus making an investment project cheaper or more expensive in 
relation to various time periods. 
 
In Table (1), using the depreciation rates for tax purposes
4
, and for Area A (Athens-Piraeus and surrounding 
areas comprising the Department of Attica), the corresponding values of  z  have been calculated for equipment and 
buildings. It was chosen to report on Area A, since it is believed (and there are a lot of indications to support this 
supposition)
5
 that the representative firm is situated in the Attica Department. The discount rate used was taken to be 
an annual average of the long term loans interest rate for manufacturing, supplied by the Bank of Greece, as 
depreciation deductions are expressed in nominal terms. 
 
The values of  z  for equipment are generally higher than those for buildings given the sorter useful life for 
tax purposes recognized for these assets. In addition one can observe from a diagrammatic representation of the trend 
of  z  since 1950, that most of the time z  has remained virtually constant with no serious fluctuations that could cause 
important changes in the value of the user cost of capital. 
 
Other tax allowances that can now be considered are tax-free reserves, investment deductions and investment 
allowances that have been provided by the Greek tax system.
6 
The provisions for tax-free reserves and investment 
deductions cannot be incorporated mechanistically into the calculation of z. These two provisions are completely 
dependent on the amount of net profits. A 100 per cent deduction of net profits completely deprived tax authorities of 
any tax revenues from new investments. Similarly, a 50 per cent deduction of net profits before 1967 for the 
representative firm, could have had the same results on government revenue if one considers also the various 
depreciation allowances in use at that time.
7
 Mainly after 1972, when all these net profit deduction provisions were 
abolished, and the new system of investment allowances started to be applied, corporate tax- revenues began to 
increase substantially given also that no investment allowances were available for the representative firm of Area A. 
 
 The application of investment allowances in the value of z will provide a new time series for z under the 
assumption however that firms’ profits were enough to absorb the allowances available to them. In a relevant search 
(Anastassiou, 2005) it has been found though that investment allowances were not operative for marginal investments 
and this has been  tested by comparing manufacturing investment outlays and the maximum amount of net profits that 
could be deducted each year for investment expenditures. The later figures (derived from the application of tax 
allowances to the amount of net profits as defined by Greek law) were found to be on average much lower than gross 
investment realized each year, suggesting the ineffectiveness of incentive provisions at the margin. This provides new 
grounds in the use of various formulas that are applied below for the calculation of c. 
  
USER COST OF CAPITAL CALCULATIONS  
 
 The effect of tax provisions on investment behavior within the neoclassical framework is assessed through 
the calculation of the user cost of capital. Recalling a previous Part, the user cost expression with no tax 
considerations was given by  
( )c q r q

                                                                                                                                                            (6) 
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If taxation is introduced, the value of c becomes 
(1 )
( )
(1 )
tz
c q r
t


 

                                                                                                                                                   (4) 
and when q

is taken into consideration the latter expression is written 
(1 )
( )
(1 )
tz
c q r q
t

 
  

                                                                                                                                            (7) 
 
Table 1 
Present Value Of Depreciation Allowances On A Unit Investment In Equipment And Buildings, Area A, 1950-1982 
 
 
Year 
Equipment Buildings  
Discount 
Rate (%) 
Depreciation  
Rate ( id ) 
Tax Life 
1( )
ii d
n   
(1 )
1
i
i
n
d
r
i
z


  
Depreciation  
Rate ( id ) 
Tax Life 
1( )
ii d
n   
(1 )
1
i
i
n
d
r
i
z


  
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
19541 
19542 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
19821 
19822 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1400 
0.1400 
0.1400 
0.1400 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1800 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
7.14 
7.14 
7.14 
7.14 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.35 
0.7209 
0.7209 
0.7209 
0.7209 
0.7582 
0.7525 
0.7803 
0.7525 
0.7525 
0.7991 
0.8429 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8666 
0.8119 
0.8119 
0.8119 
0.8119 
0.7985 
0.7385 
0.6639 
0.6639 
0.6989 
0.6707 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.0750 
0.0750 
0.0750 
0.0750 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.0960 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
13.33 
13.33 
13.33 
13.33 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.42 
0.5650 
0.5650 
0.5650 
0.5650 
0.6145 
0.5538 
0.5853 
0.5538 
0.5538 
0.6484 
0.7056 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.6635 
0.6015 
0.6015 
0.6015 
0.6015 
0.5867 
0.5232 
0.4494 
0.4494 
0.4833 
0.4844 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
10.00 
10.00 
9.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
7.92 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
8.25 
10.50 
10.50. 
10.50 
10.50 
11.09 
13.92 
18.00 
18.00 
16.00 
16.00 
Source: For depreciation rates see incentive laws reported in text. For discount rates see Bank of Greece, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, various issues.  1First two quarters, 2Last two quarters. 
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Using these expressions for c and the corresponding ones that can be derived from the above three if for 
example q

= 0 and q = 1 or q

  0 and q = 1, we have derived in Table (2) for the representative firm various values 
of c for the two kinds of capital assets, equipment and structures, for Greek manufacturing and for the period 1950-
1982. The expressions for c, denoted by c1, c2 for either equipment or structures, correspond to the following 
specifications: 
 
11
1
12
( )
1950 1972
( )
r c
c period
r q c



   
  
    
8 
 
 
Table 2 
User Cost Of Capital For Manufacturing Investment In Equipment And Structures, Area A, 1950-1982 
 
 
Year 
Equipment  Structures 
C1 C2 C1 C2 
 C11 C12 C21 C22 C11 C12 C21 C22 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
0.2200 
0.2200 
0.2200 
0.2200 
0.2200 
0.1900 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1792 
0.1700 
0.1700 
0.1700 
0.1700 
0.1700 
0.1700 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.1750 
 
 
0.2400 
0.1100 
0.1800 
0.1400 
0.0600 
0.1600 
0.1200 
0.1700 
0.2400 
0.1400 
0.0001 
0.1600 
0.0500 
0.1700 
0.1300 
0.1700 
0.1550 
0.1350 
0.1250 
0.2050 
0.1050 
0.0550 
0.0450 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1945 
0.2289 
0.2289 
0.2289 
0.2289 
0.2372 
0.2779 
0.3383 
0.3521 
0.3200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0666 
0.0614 
0.0391 
0.0726 
0.1172 
0.1022 
0.1384 
0.1570 
0.1509 
0.1108 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.1750 
0.1550 
0.1450 
0.1550 
0.1550 
0.1550 
0.1342 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.1300 
0.1300 
0.1300 
0.1300 
0.1300 
0.1300 
0.1300 
 
0.0650 
0.0450 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.0450 
0.0950 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.1242 
0.1250 
0.1250 
0.0650 
0.1250 
0.1150 
0.0750 
0.0300 
0.1100 
0.1300 
0.1000 
0.0400 
0.1300 
0.0500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1603 
0.1995 
0.1995 
0.1995 
0.1995 
0.2083 
0.2515 
0.3151 
0.3342 
0.3000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0729 
-0.0748 
0.1247 
0.0249 
-0.0125 
-0.0303 
-0.0334 
0.0737 
0.1635 
0.1745 
Source: See text 
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21
2
22
(1 )
( )
(1 )
1973 1982
(1 )
( )
(1 )
tz
r c
t
c period
tz
r q c
t



 
   
  
   
  
 
where  
1
(1 )
n
i
i
i
z d r 

     (see Table  1). 
 
The values of r were taken to be the same as those used for the calculation of z. The corporate income tax 
rates used were those for companies whose shares are listed on the Athens Stock Exchange under the assumption that 
the bulk of manufacturing investment in Greece is undertaken by these companies.  Jorgenson’s method of estimating 
the replacement rate was adopted here. Consulting various Greek studies undertaken in the past (Krengel and Mertens, 
1966, Kintis, 1973, Handrinos, 1979), the asset lifetime N for equipment and structures was taken to be 25 and 45 
years respectively; then according to Hall and Jorgenson (1971) where 
1
2.5
N
  , it was taken δ = 0.1 for 
equipment and δ = 0.055 for structures.  
Finally, the derivation of q

 was made assuming perfect foresight by using some unpublished data of the 
former Ministry of Co-ordination, provided for the period 1948-1982. What it can be observed from these series is the 
great variability in the values of these indices (especially those for equipment) in the different years, where some 
small increases are followed by immense jumps in the succeeding years.  This has an effect of q

that further 
causes great variation in the value of c.  
 
In Figures (1), (2), (3), (4), the trend of c over the period 1950-1982 is indicated. When expectations are 
static (i.e. q

=0),  c  is kept almost constant for the three decade period for both capital assets (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Only during the last years of the sample has  c  started to display some upward trend. 
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       Figure 1: Values of “C” for Equipment   [ c11  (1950-1972),  c21 (1973-1982)] 
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Figure 2: Values Of “C” For Structures  [ c11  (1950-1972),  c21 (1973-1982)] 
 
 
 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
19
50
19
51
19
52
19
53
19
54
19
55
19
56
19
57
19
58
19
59
19
60
19
61
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
Time
c
 
Figure 3: Values Of “C” For Equipment   [c12 (1950-1972),   c22  (1973-1982)] 
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Figure 4: Values Of “C” For Structures   [c12 (1950-1972),   c22  (1973-1982)] 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The examination of the effect on investment of some main incentive measures provided by the Greek 
authorities over the prior years has shown that these measures had not much contribution in positively influencing the 
rate of investment expenditure. The fiscal variables used, according to the specifications of the neoclassical theory, 
were the rate of corporate taxation and the fiscal parameter z into which changes in depreciation policy and the 
various tax allowances in use during all this period were incorporated. The test of fiscal parameters on investment was 
made for the two kinds of capital assets, equipment, and structures. 
  
It was indicated that the corporate tax rate had remained almost constant over the period. In addition the 
value of z, incorporating depreciation allowances only, did not present any major variations for either equipment or 
structures. Thus c, the cost of capital variable, used in neoclassical theory for tax incentives’ evaluation, was not 
affected much by tax provisions and in its turn could not affect decisively the desired level of capital stock and thus 
the amount of net investment.  
 
So, investment behavior in Greek manufacturing cannot be studied using the neoclassical theory of capital 
accumulation (in its part concerning changes in user cost as important investment determinants), since there is no 
substitution effect of investment deductions  (defined in a more general sense) at least for the period under 
investigation, or there is a small one since c is not absolutely constant (in which case Jorgenson’s model would be 
reduced to the flexible accelerator): while λ may be inoperative and excluded from the calculations of c,  t  and  z  still 
remain operative. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 Excluding, in the above sense, the neoclassical theory as a source of study of the investment behavior in 
Greek manufacturing, our search for the appropriate model has to be directed towards other theories of the more ad 
hoc nature which incorporate measures of profits or the availability of internal funds as possible determinants of 
investment. These internal financing sources could enter in a properly specified investment function, either as 
determinants of the speed of adjustment of desired to actual capital stock or as determinants of the desired capital 
stock itself. The role of incentives then could be entered in the above framework as affecting the liquidity variables, 
and we could try to examine what this ‘liquidity’ effect of incentives could be, if any.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1.   For a straight line depreciation pattern, id =1/n, where n is the lifetime of the asset for tax purposes, and then  
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In continuous time the discounted value of depreciation allowances per unit of capital (K0) is 
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2.   Similar results for this case are given in Brown (1948), and Musgrave (1959). 
3.   In case of an initial allowance (λ1) the value of  z  will be  
1
1
(1 ) .(1 )ii
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


    
since λ1 increases the normal depreciation charge in the first year, but annual depreciation charges in later years 
are smaller than they would have been if there were no initial allowances.  
4.  These rates have been derived by a very detailed and scrutinized research of various incentive laws applied in 
Greece for an earlier three decade period (1950-1982). We report for this period since this belongs to a greater 
(1950-2000) period which is currently investigated for the assessment of incentive provisions for manufacturing 
investment in Greece and for which smaller period we have already gathered material for investigation. From a 
preliminary research, one can say that this first period’s incentive provisions are better offered for research under 
the neoclassical theory, while recent incentive measures are mainly capital related provisions of the grant 
supporting style.  Incentive laws that have been searched for depreciation rate changes are: L 942/1949, L 
2901/1954,  L 3765/1957,  EL 147/1967,  PD 88/1973,  LD  1078/1971,   L  1116/1981, L 1262/1982 (where 
L=Law, EL = Emergency Law,  PD = Presidential Degree, LD = Legislative Degree). 
5.   See Coutsoumaris (1963), pp. 133-137, for reasons of concentration in the Athens area, and Kottis (1980), pp. 21-
25. 
6.   The relevant incentive laws which have been searched and refer to these provisions are: EL 942/1949,LD 
2176/1952,LD 3213/1955,LD 4002/1959, EL 147/1967, LD 1078/1971, LD 1212/1972, LD 1312/1972, LD 
1377/1973, L 331/1974, L 289/1976, L 849/1978, L 1116/1981, L 1262/1982. 
7.    In fact the application of depreciation allowances alone were absorbing almost 70 per cent (buildings) or 80 per 
cent (equipment) from net profits, with little left to be taxed  if no other allowances were in use. Of course z refers 
to a present value of future deductions. But as has been found (Anastassiou, 2005), the amounts of investment 
expenditures undertaken during all these years were much higher than the amount of profits, and deductions on 
these investments for depreciation purposes were carried forward so in a specific year they were reducing (if not 
nullifying) substantially taxable profits. 
8.  During this period no investment allowances were existent, and furthermore no tax obligations from new 
investments were in effect for the representative firm, since tax-free reserves and investment deductions were 
reducing taxable income to zero (as it was indicated before). Thus fiscal variables had no effect in the formulation 
of the user cost of capital. 
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